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Institutional practices evolve to fill gaps in all constitutional blueprints. One
of the underappreciated features of the initial constitutional settlement of war powers was the accountability of the executive through the process of budgetary authorization and the corresponding need for Congress to answer to the citizenry for the
tax implications of military expenditures. This political accountability is more
complex than often described, consisting not merely of the division of the Declare
War and Commander-in-Chief Clauses of Article I and Article II, but also of the
temporal limitation of the budgetary power for the army and a variety of practical
and political obstacles to prevent the president from going it alone in warfare. The
thesis of this Essay is that critical features of the ensuing constitutional equilibrium, which largely controlled the war power even in the absence of formally declared hostilities, have come undone as a result of the declining social and economic costs of modern forms of warfare, the development of the permanent and socially
insular standing army, and the rise of its associated military-industrial complex
as an independent institutional actor. The combination of an enormous, permanent military budget and the elimination of conscription has eroded the effectiveness of the institutional division of authority over war that emerged in the earliest
days of the republic. This broader phenomenon of constitutional disequilibrium, in
which constitutional doctrines and settlements prove dependent on the existing
state of technology and institutional arrangements, in turn highlights the difficulty
of managing today’s warfare in a fashion that avoids executive unilateralism.

INTRODUCTION
An idealized rendition of the constitutional powers regarding war would indicate an elaborate balance of authority among
the coordinate branches of government. The power to “declare
war”—as distinct from the power to “make war”—is entrusted to
Congress, while the conduct of the war itself falls within the
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president’s authority as commander in chief.1 War presumably
requires positive fiscal appropriations, which are textually limited to a duration of two years for the army2—another requirement of congressional reengagement with any serious military
conflict. The war powers exist against the backdrop of the
shared authority between the president and the Senate over foreign relations in the realization of treaties and the appointment
of ambassadors.3
Further, when issues in foreign relations lead to war, the
constitutional framework presupposes additional engagement
between the branches. The power to conscript soldiers, though
not directly engaged by the text of the Constitution, requires affirmative legislative action subject to presentment to the president. To that we may add the political consequences of the
shared burdens of taxation and sacrifice in warfare, something
that has been recognized as the defining feature of democratic
societies at war since the time of Thucydides.4
Apart from the scripted forms of institutional responsibility, the lived experience of governance under a constitution
impresses itself on the original design of our Constitution. Much
of the actual functioning of government is the product of bargaining and accommodation among the various institutional actors.5 Whether we address the scope of judicial review, the rise of
the administrative state, or the use of the filibuster, the text of
the Constitution gives only the most rudimentary outline of how
these practices would evolve over centuries of application. We
start from the premise that the war powers are no exception to
the rule of structural evolution. Extensive scholarship has
mined the constitutional debates over each of the clauses addressing war and foreign relations, and the debates over the
War Powers Resolution6 and the scope of modern presidential

	
  
1

Compare US Const Art I, § 8, cl 11, with US Const Art II, § 2, cl 1.
See US Const Art I, § 8, cl 12.
3
See David M. Golove and Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early
American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition,
85 NYU L Rev 932, 989–1015 (2010).
4
See Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 143–51 (Penguin 1972) (Rex
Warner, trans) (giving an account of Pericles’s funeral oration, which extolled the virtues
of democracy and cautioned the Athenians that each citizen must undergo hardships in
winning the war).
5
See Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 Colum L Rev 1595,
1601 (2014) (arguing that “intermural negotiation is a pervasive and enduring feature of
the constitutional landscape”).
6
Pub L No 93-148, 87 Stat 555 (1973), codified as amended at 50 USC § 1541 et seq.
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authority have forced constitutional scholars to revisit these issues time and again.7
Our attention here is not so much on the particular practical
arrangements that emerge over time but rather on how changed
circumstances alter heretofore-stable institutional settlements
under the constitutional framework. A simple example of the fiscal cost of overseas military engagement makes this introductory point.
The Spanish-American War is estimated to have cost about
1.1 percent of the United States’ gross domestic product (GDP)
in its peak year of 1899, out of a total annual defense budget of
1.5 percent of GDP.8 Even a secondary foreign engagement that
did not necessitate a draft of civilians as soldiers required a substantial proportion of the GDP and, more significantly, consumed almost the entirety of the military appropriation.9 By
contrast, the Persian Gulf War is estimated to have had an incremental cost of 0.3 percent of GDP, out of a total defense
budget in 1991 of 4.6 percent of GDP.10 In other words, by 1991,
the marginal cost of engaging in limited foreign combat to overthrow an occupying power had fallen to an additional 7 percent
of baseline defense spending, from an additional 275 percent of
baseline defense spending in 1899. By the time of the 2011
NATO campaign against Libya, the marginal cost of overthrowing a foreign government had fallen to $1.1 billion11 from a
baseline defense budget of $768 billion,12 constituting an incremental increase of less than 0.2 percent of defense spending.
To push this point, the invasion of Grenada in 1983 cost
$134.4 million13—about the same amount as was proposed that
year for new shortwave-broadcasting facilities for Voice of America
in Sri Lanka and Botswana14—and in turn about one-third the

	
  
7
See William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare
War, 82 Cornell L Rev 695, 696–98 (1997).
8
Stephen Daggett, Costs of Major U.S. Wars *1 (Congressional Research Service,
June 29, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/2LFR-MBSZ.
9
Id.
10 Id at *2.
11 Kevin Baron, For the U.S., War against Qaddafi Cost Relatively Little: $1.1 Billion (The Atlantic, Oct 21, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/YLK7-E4LJ.
12 See Rosa Brooks, Welfare State (Foreign Policy, July 19, 2012), archived at
http://perma.cc/E5ZG-VRCF.
13 The Military: Auditing an Invasion, Time 49 (July 23, 1984).
14 See John E. Ward, Ithiel De Sola Pool, and Richard J. Solomon, A Study of Future Directions for the Voice of America in the Changing World of International Broad-
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amount that was actually spent that year on improvements to
Amtrak service on the Northeast Corridor.15 The toppling of the
Grenadian regime cost about the same in constant dollars as
was invested in 2013 in a Michigan automobile-batteryproduction facility.16
It would be foolhardy to indulge the belief that the falling
marginal cost of overseas military activity would be without institutional and constitutional repercussions. But we want to use
the concept of the falling marginal cost more expansively than
simply noting the fiscal reality that much modern warfare requires little in the way of additional appropriations. Also significant is the relative isolation of the social costs of war as nonconscript armies localize the casualty side of combat to discrete
communities, oftentimes far from the front lines of political engagement. In turn, the diminished fiscal strain and the lowered
political costs allow war to be subsumed within customary partisan battles that do not compel the institutional give-and-take
envisioned in the original constitutional design.
The main thesis presented here is that changes in the institutional forms of American political life, combined with technological developments and the altered nature of warfare, have
placed stress on the original constitutional arrangement of the
separation of powers regarding warfare. Among the developments examined are the rise of the standing American military
as an independent institutional actor, the declining social and
economic costs of warfare, and the eclipse of state-to-state relations as the drivers of international conflict. The focus here is
not on efficient bargaining between the branches or the proper
interpretation of the Declare War Clause itself but rather on the
erosion of the background assumptions that underpin the suite of
constitutional arrangements concerning warfare. Constitutional
doctrines that are facially independent from the current state of
technology and institutional arrangements prove vulnerable to
unforeseen exogenous influences. In this Essay, we sketch out
the implications of this constitutional disequilibrium for the
evolved institutional settlement over the conduct of war.

	
  
casting *appendix 12 (MIT Research Program on Communications Policy, Apr 25, 1983),
archived at http://perma.cc/845W-95KP.
15 Annual Report 1983: Amtrak Is America’s Railroad *23 (National Railroad Passenger Corporation), archived at http://perma.cc/PLE4-K4FK.
16 Jim Harger, Holland’s LG Chem Plant Built 2 Years Ago Produces First Lithium
Ion Batteries (MLive, Aug 2, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/2NRM-M4Q6.
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I. DISEQUILIBRIUM
By their nature, constitutions leave gaps. Between the uncertainty of commitments to equality, liberty, or process and the
incompletely realized instrumentalities of government, much
work remains. With the advent of judicial review in the United
States, some portion of the gap filling occurred through case
elaboration—but only part of it. With respect to the mechanisms
of actual governmental functioning, the normal processes involved institutional adaptation with only rare judicial intervention. For example, uncertainty over the ability of the federal
government to expand the territorial union created a near constitutional impasse in President Thomas Jefferson’s administration as it engaged the prospect of the Louisiana Purchase.17 Once
resolved as a matter of practical politics, however, the initial
purchase became unquestioned authority for the annexation of
further territories, the purchase of Alaska, and the conquest of
overseas lands in the Spanish-American War.18 Even when
courts did enter the field in those later disputes, their review
consisted primarily of citing the authority of the Louisiana Purchase as presumptive constitutional authority.
We seek to draw attention less to the processes of constitutional settlement than to the tectonics beneath those processes
that produce disequilibrium. We suggest three sources of such
disequilibrium—not so much to claim their exclusivity but rather to focus on how the original constitutional understanding of
the powers over war and peace may have been altered over time.
The sources of disequilibrium that concern us are technological
change, institutional realignments, and societal relations.
A.

Technological Change

An implicit assumption in constitutional law is that both
formal constitutional strictures and less formal constitutional

	
  
17 This abbreviated account draws from Samuel Issacharoff, Meriwether Lewis, the
Air Force, and the Surge: The Problem of Constitutional Settlement, 12 Lewis & Clark L
Rev 649, 653–59 (2008).
18 This was the key recognition from the Insular Cases, a series of cases decided
upon the conquest of new territories during the Spanish-American War. As the Court
noted in one of the Insular Cases, the federal government’s ability to acquire territory
and structure the form of its governance was a matter of applied convention rather than
of constitutional text. Downes v Bidwell, 182 US 244, 250 (1901) (“[T]he power to establish territorial governments has been too long exercised by Congress and acquiesced in
by this court to be deemed an unsettled question.”).
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settlements are grounded in an enduring constitutional balance
that does not depend on a particular technological status quo.19
The same provisions that governed the early nation’s army and
navy govern an air force and a space program, and the same balance that determined the propriety of a steamboat monopoly20
governs the ability of the federal government to police discrimination along the channels of interstate commerce.21 While mass
political shifts can prompt a reconsideration of settled law,22 and
while doctrines may have to grow in complexity to keep apace
with the institutions they govern,23 constitutional doctrines and
settlements are not thought to be at the whim of the technological moment.24
A brief example from the field of criminal procedure makes
clear how problematic this assumption of stability may be. The
third-party doctrine is a bedrock principle of Fourth Amendment
law holding that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information that is given to a third party or exposed to the
public.25 The paradigmatic examples of the former are bank records26 and dialed phone numbers27 and of the latter are one’s
movements in public.28 Each case, and the broader doctrinal
principle derived therefrom, seems to be straightforward and
technologically neutral: once you give up your privacy in a given
piece of information by exposing it to another person or to the
public at large, you can no longer object when the government
uses it, no matter how it was obtained.

	
  
19 See generally, for example, Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of
the Fourth Amendment, 125 Harv L Rev 476 (2011) (demonstrating how law has evolved
in order to attempt to maintain the Fourth Amendment balance as technology has
changed).
20 See Gibbons v Ogden, 22 US (9 Wheat) 1, 89–90 (1824).
21 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc v United States, 379 US 241, 252–55 (1964).
22 See, for example, Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, 347 US 483, 492
(1954) (“In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the
[Fourteenth] Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was
written.”).
23 See, for example, City of Arlington, Texas v Federal Communications Commission,
133 S Ct 1863, 1866 (2013) (considering the degree of deference that ought to be accorded
to agencies making determinations about the scope of their statutory jurisdiction).
24 See, for example, Kyllo v United States, 533 US 27, 34 (2001) (“To withdraw protection of this minimum expectation would be to permit police technology to erode the
privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.”).
25 For an overview of this doctrine, see generally Lucas Issacharoff and Kyle
Wirshba, Restoring Reason to the Third Party Doctrine, 100 Minn L Rev 987 (2016).
26 See United States v Miller, 425 US 435, 442 (1976).
27 See Smith v Maryland, 442 US 735, 742 (1979).
28 See United States v Knotts, 460 US 276, 281 (1983).
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While courts and scholars have strived for technological
neutrality,29 each of these examples has proved surprisingly dependent on assumed technological limitations. Courts have divided over the seemingly straightforward application of Smith v
Maryland,30 involving the government’s collection of an individual’s call records, to the NSA’s collection and analysis of everyone’s call records all of the time.31 By the time of United States v
Jones,32 a majority of the justices had indicated that the proliferation of information in the hands of third parties and the expansion of police surveillance capabilities cast significant doubt
on the continued viability of the third-party doctrine.33
Previously, and independent of constitutional doctrine, government surveillance was self-limiting because of the expense
and difficulty of following a suspect in public or eavesdropping
on conversations. Technology changed the feasibility of all kinds
of government oversight of citizens.34 The declining marginal
cost of executive action has significantly destabilized the thirdparty doctrine. While data mining and GPS tracking are particular technological developments with discernable impacts, the
phenomenon of technological change undermining a settled allocation of powers between the government and the individual, or
between the branches of government, is a broader one. The
third-party doctrine is hardly the only area of criminal procedure
to reveal a doctrinal dependence on a certain state of technology:
The Court has recently refused to apply a doctrine allowing the
warrantless search of an arrestee’s effects to the search of the
arrestee’s cell phone, finding that the comparison of cell phones
to wallets or purses “is like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon. . . . Modern

	
  
29 See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 Mich L Rev 561,
577–81 (2009).
30 442 US 735 (1979).
31 Compare Klayman v Obama, 957 F Supp 2d 1, 33 (DDC 2013), vacd and remd,
800 F3d 559 (DC Cir 2015), with American Civil Liberties Union v Clapper, 959 F Supp
2d 724, 752 (SDNY 2013), vacd and remd in part, 785 F3d 787 (2d Cir 2015). See also
Note, Data Mining, Dog Sniffs, and the Fourth Amendment, 128 Harv L Rev 691, 697–98
(2014) (discussing Smith and the modern scope of the third-party doctrine).
32 132 S Ct 945 (2012).
33 Id at 955, 957 (Sotomayor concurring); id at 961–63 (Alito concurring in the
judgment).
34 See, for example, Klayman, 957 F Supp 2d at 33 (“[T]he almost-Orwellian technology that enables the Government to store and analyze the phone metadata of every
telephone user in the United States is unlike anything that could have been conceived in
1979 [when Smith was decided].”).
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cell phones, as a category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond
those implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a
purse.”35 And criminal procedure is hardly the only area of constitutional law to be unsettled by technological shifts;36 as we argue, technological change has, in a similar fashion, critically undermined the original constitutional settlement regarding the
war powers.
B.

Institutional Realignments

The changing nature of institutions that are not explicitly
recognized in the Constitution has had well-recognized destabilizing effects on constitutional settlements. Perhaps the most
significant, and almost certainly the most examined, institutional shift in American constitutional life has been the rise of
political parties—especially their consolidation into ideologically polarized and cohesive entities. Professors Daryl Levinson
and Richard Pildes have discussed in detail how the consolidation of political parties has undermined the assumptions underpinning the core constitutional framework of checks and
balances.37 The notion of checks and balances, as laid out in
Federalist 51, requires that “[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambition,” thus “giving to those who administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal
motives, to resist encroachments of the others.”38 Yet even if
ambition among the political class has not notably subsided

	
  
35

Riley v California, 134 S Ct 2473, 2488–89 (2014).
The Court still struggles to apply its personal jurisdiction jurisprudence to commerce and speech conducted via the Internet. See, for example, J. McIntyre Machinery,
Ltd v Nicastro, 131 S Ct 2780, 2793 (2011) (Breyer concurring in the judgment) (“The
plurality seems to state strict rules that limit jurisdiction. . . . But what do those standards mean when a company targets the world by selling products from its Web site?”).
See also Blumenthal v Drudge, 992 F Supp 44, 49 (DDC 1998) (noting the “unprecedented challenges relating to . . . reputational rights of individuals” posed by the Internet).
37 Daryl J. Levinson and Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119
Harv L Rev 2312, 2315 (2006) (noting the shifts in political dynamics that depend on
whether the government is divided or unified by political parties and explaining how these call into question the assumption of separation of powers). For a challenge to this basic
thesis, see Richard A. Epstein, Why Parties and Powers Both Matter: A Separationist Response to Levinson and Pildes, 119 Harv L Rev F 210, 211 (2006) (“[T]he conventional
tools of constitutional interpretation lead, without any detour into political realism, to a
conclusion that Professors Levinson and Pildes defend by much unnecessary labor: the
Congress sets the rules, which the President and only the President implements.”).
38 Federalist 51 (Madison), in The Federalist 347, 349 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E.
Cooke, ed).
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since 1787,39 the means of its furtherance have been dramatically altered by institutional shifts. The ability of the Speaker of the
House or of the president to pursue an agenda now depends less
on the relative strength of his or her respective branch of government and more on the presence of partisan compatriots in the
other political branch—hence Senator Mitch McConnell’s profoundly realist statement in 2010 that “[t]he single most important thing [the Republican Senate] want[s] to achieve is for
President Obama to be a one-term president.”40 Other scholars
have shown how partisan politics unsettles the similar assumptions of competition underpinning federalism,41 as well as the
supposed dynamics of interbranch settlements reflected in Justice
Robert Jackson’s Youngstown framework.42
As Levinson and Pildes note, courts have proved slow to
acknowledge this shift and have overlooked Jackson’s cautionary note in his concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v
Sawyer43 regarding the political complements to presidential authority.44 But while partisan politics has yet to make much of a
mark on the United States Reports, it has destabilized the practical settlement of institutional practices from the filibuster45 to

	
  
39 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 Harv L Rev 1077, 1090
(2014) (“The state and federal governments may not themselves be self-interested political actors with empire-building ambitions, pitted against each other in a competition for
power . . . but this is a decent description of the partisan officials who populate them.”)
(quotation marks omitted).
40 Glenn Kessler, When Did McConnell Say He Wanted to Make Obama a ‘OneTerm President’? (Wash Post, Sept 25, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/X6XK-DY2N.
41 See, for example, Bulman-Pozen, 127 Harv L Rev at 1080 (cited in note 39)
(“States oppose federal policy because they are governed by individuals who affiliate with
a different political party than do those in charge at the national level, not because they
are states as such.”).
42 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer, 343 US 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson concurring). See also Curtis A. Bradley and Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 Harv L Rev 411, 414–15 (2012) (suggesting a need to closely consider the reality of how the political branches interact, because “Congress as a body does not
systematically seek to protect its prerogatives against presidential encroachment”).
43 343 US 579 (1952).
44 Levinson and Pildes, 119 Harv L Rev at 2314–15 (cited in note 37), quoting
Youngstown, 343 US at 654 (Jackson concurring):

[The] rise of the party system has made a significant extraconstitutional supplement to real executive power. No appraisal of [the president’s] necessities is
realistic which overlooks that he heads a political system as well as a legal system. Party loyalties and interests, sometimes more binding than law, extend his
effective control into branches of government other than his own and he often
may win, as a political leader, what he cannot command under the Constitution.
45 For a historical account of the use of the filibuster, from its absence in early Congresses to an explosion in use during the late twentieth century to Democrats’ resort to
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the volatile swings in the frequency of oversight hearings, depending on whether control of the House, Senate, and presidency is divided or unified.46
There is little need to remake the wheel regarding the effects of partisan politics on the checks and balances framework.
Our goal, rather, is to situate the phenomenon as merely one area in which institutional change has destabilized constitutional
arrangements. Others have pointed out how the rise of labor unions as a new institutional mediator of employer-employee relations in the late nineteenth and early to mid-twentieth centuries
necessitated doctrinal accommodations in the areas of free
speech47 and due process.48 Moreover, we aim to situate institutional change itself as merely one of a number of destabilizing
factors that can operate to disrupt constitutional settlements.
C.

Societal Change

Closely related to technological and institutional changes are
shifts that take place at a societal level. Here we speak not of
shifting political winds, such as attitudes toward interracial marriage (though these were undoubtedly influenced by societal shifts
including the Great Migration and the integration of the military
in the aftermath of World War II), but rather of shifts in the way
that society itself is organized. Such a broad category can encom-

	
  
the “nuclear option” in 2013, see Tonja Jacobi and Jeff VanDam, The Filibuster and Reconciliation: The Future of Majoritarian Lawmaking in the U.S. Senate, 47 UC Davis L
Rev 261, 273–84 (2013). See also Barbara Sinclair, The New World of U.S. Senators, in
Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds, Congress Reconsidered 1, 8 (CQ Press
10th ed 2013) (summarizing, quantitatively, the increase in filibusters from the midtwentieth to twenty-first centuries).
46 See Samuel Issacharoff, Political Safeguards in Democracies at War, 29 Oxford J
Legal Stud 189, 207 (2009) (“[I]t is a matter of profound dishonour to our constitutional
system that, prior to the 2006 elections, not once did Congress, under the control of the
Republican Party, hold meaningful hearings over the conduct of the Iraq War by a Republican President.”).
47 See Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions a Constitutional Anomaly?, 114 Mich L Rev
169, 183–84 (2015) (explaining Supreme Court jurisprudence holding that “[i]t was permissible to charge objectors for union expenditures that were germane to collective bargaining and contract administration” and that “whatever minor infringement agency
fees entailed for dissenters’ free speech interests was justified by the state’s legitimate
interest in preventing free riders from undermining the union’s ability to represent the
whole bargaining unit”).
48 See Harry H. Wellington, The Constitution, the Labor Union, and “Governmental
Action”, 70 Yale L J 345, 345 (1961) (arguing that, while the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment applies against only the federal government, plaintiffs—including
those discriminated against by labor unions—can succeed in Fifth Amendment suits if
they show a “sufficient nexus” between the private organization and the government).
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pass everything from urbanization to the transition from an agricultural to a manufacturing to a services economy, but here we
focus briefly on the increasingly national scope of economic activity and economic actors beginning in the mid-nineteenth century.
The basic point is that societal change can prove to be a significant destabilizing factor in institutional settlements.
The increase in the size and scope of interstate economic activity in the latter half of the nineteenth century is in many
ways a story about the railroads that Cornelius Vanderbilt and
others built into massive and powerful corporate entities. Dissatisfaction with the untrammeled power of both the railroads
and the marketplace in which they were forced to compete led to
pressure for regulation from producers and consumers of rail
transit.49 This pressure led, in the United States and elsewhere,
to national regulatory action.50 Two sets of constraints—the constitutional disability of the states to regulate interstate rail networks51 and the institutional inability of a legislature to engage
in the frequent, iterative regulatory mechanism of rate setting—
forced on the political branches a radical innovation in the form
of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).52
Prior to the creation of the ICC, the executive branch’s role
in economic regulation was remarkably limited: economic regulation was thought to be largely in the hands of the states, with
occasional congressional and judicial interventions when commerce crossed state lines. One indication of this limited scope is
the size of the federal civilian workforce: in the early 1870s, the
federal government employed only 51,020 civilians, of whom
more than 70 percent were postal workers.53 Yet the ICC marked
not merely a shift in scope or policy but rather a constitutional
innovation: “[n]ever before had Congress established an independent regulatory commission to exercise the commerce power

	
  
49 See Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Interstate Commerce Commission: The Tortuous Path from Regulation to Deregulation of America’s Infrastructure,
95 Marq L Rev 1151, 1153–58 (2012) (describing how the Panic of 1873 led to “[a] widespread interest in regulation”).
50 See id at 1160.
51 See Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Railway Co v Illinois, 118 US 557, 572–73
(1886) (noting that the Commerce Clause was adopted to prevent states from devising
their own rules and prices for transportation).
52 See Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial
Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy 166–73 (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2014)
(chronicling the necessity for and development of national railroad regulation).
53 Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, The Commanding Heights: The Battle for
the World Economy 30 (Simon & Schuster 2002).
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conferred under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.”54 Thus,
the changing national economy forced a new understanding of
constitutional doctrine, wherein Congress could delegate significant portions of its regulatory power to the executive. The implications of this shift were vast, paving the path for the more longlasting regulatory reforms of the Progressive Era and the New
Deal55 and prompting accompanying shifts in legal doctrine to
enable national regulation of a national economy. The Supreme
Court was forced (sometimes reluctantly) to pave the way for
legislative and regulatory encroachments on labor contracts,56
local economic production,57 and even federal courts’ jurisdiction.58 A century and a quarter later, Chief Justice John Roberts
noted with dismay the scope and power of the administrative
state, describing it as “wield[ing] vast power and touch[ing] almost every aspect of daily life” as it stands astride the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.59
The debates in Citizens United v Federal Election Commis60
sion further expose the vulnerability of institutional settlements to destabilization in the face of significant societal transformations. In that case, Justices Antonin Scalia and John Paul
Stevens, concurring and dissenting respectively, vigorously contested the original understanding of how the First Amendment
applied to corporate speech.61 Yet they agreed that the shift from
a small number of legislatively chartered corporations to generalpurpose corporations of enormous size and number affects the
implications of that understanding, whatever it was.62 Stevens
saw this as the rise of actors with tremendous power to shape

	
  
54

Dempsey, 95 Marq L Rev at 1161 (cited in note 49).
See id at 1161–66.
56 See, for example, West Coast Hotel Co v Parrish, 300 US 379, 399–400 (1937)
(upholding the constitutionality of a state minimum wage law).
57 See, for example, Wickard v Filburn, 317 US 111, 128–29 (1942) (upholding federal regulation of wheat production as applied to an individual farmer’s wheat grown for
personal use, on the ground that such farming would affect interstate commerce in the
aggregate).
58 See, for example, Lockerty v Phillips, 319 US 182, 187 (1943) (holding that the
congressional power to create lower courts includes the power to determine the courts’
jurisdiction).
59 City of Arlington, 133 S Ct at 1877–78 (Roberts dissenting), quoting Free Enterprise Fund v Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 561 US 477, 499 (2010).
60 558 US 310 (2010).
61 Id at 385–93 (Scalia concurring); id at 425–32 (Stevens concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
62 Id at 385–89 (Scalia concurring); id at 426–27, 469–70 (Stevens concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
55
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lives and distort discourse,63 while Scalia argued that modern
corporations, as opposed to their forebears’ legislatively granted
monopolies, are more benign participants in the marketplace of
ideas.64 While the doomsayers’ predictions of a corporate takeover
of electioneering have not come to pass,65 the potential stakes of
corporate political speech have risen dramatically. As the next
Part argues, such changes in societal conditions—along with
technological changes and institutional shifts—have caused
equally influential shifts in the allocation of warmaking authority, yet with considerably less scholarly and judicial engagement.
II. THE COST OF WAR
Our thesis is that each of these sources of disequilibrium
has taken hold in the modern era. To be sure, beginning with
the Quasi War with France, the formal declaration of war has
been secondary in American military endeavors.66 But we argue
that the current practice of conducting military operations of indefinite duration against nonstate enemies of indistinct territorial scope has altered the constitutional balance, even as compared with the Quasi War period. Applying the same sources of
constitutional disequilibrium, we suggest that changes in the
technology of war, the institutional presence of a formidable
permanent military structure, and the increased social isolation
of the armed forces have all contributed to a reordering of the
structural balance that emerges in the war context.
A.

The Altered Technology of War

Perhaps foremost in impact, the way that wars are fought
has changed dramatically over time. In the quarter century
since the United States first deployed a ground mobilization

	
  
63 Id at 469 (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]here are substantial reasons why a legislature might conclude that unregulated general treasury expenditures will give corporations ‘unfai[r] influence’ in the electoral process and distort
public debate in ways that undermine rather than advance the interests of listeners.”)
(citation omitted).
64 Citizens United, 558 US at 387–89 (Scalia concurring).
65 See Samuel Issacharoff and Jeremy Peterman, Special Interests after Citizens
United: Access, Replacement, and Interest Group Response to Legal Change, 9 Ann Rev L
& Soc Sci 185, 199–201 (2013).
66 See J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 Duke L J 27, 56 (1991) (“The first notable
limited war was the Quasi-War with France in 1798-1800 in which President Adams did
not seek and Congress did not issue a formal declaration of war in response to the
French seizure of American ships.”).
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against Saddam Hussein, combat has consisted primarily of repelling nonstate actors whose fighting is largely removed from
the norms of state-to-state warfare.67 The tools of warfare have
moved toward sophisticated weaponry through the command of
airspace, the use of drones for highly targeted attacks,68 and the
deployment of specialized forces through helicopter and mobile
ground units.69 In such a battlefield, conscripts are more of a liability than an asset against enemies who seek to capture ground
troops not as prisoners of war but as hostages for ransom or for
highly propagandized executions.
This is all well-trodden territory, but our focus is on the absence of the compelled political exchanges that necessarily accompany the mobilization for war when the state must conscript
from across the population. Although conscription in the United
States dates to the state militias of the colonial period,70 federal
conscription is a newer phenomenon. The first attempt at a federal draft came with the War of 1812, though the war ended before Congress was able to successfully pass a conscription bill.71
A small draft to reinforce the volunteer-heavy Union army during the Civil War provoked anticonscription riots in New York
and elsewhere.72 The long-standing draft that continued after
World War II came to a halt after fueling the Vietnam protests73

	
  
67 See Anthony H. Cordesman, The Real Revolution in Military Affairs (Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Aug 5, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/2ECW
-7QKG (noting the rise of “conflicts between states and nonstate actors” that “are not
high-technology duels between conventional forces, but struggles that pit governments
and their allies against opponents that fight along religious and cultural lines and use
their own internal divisions and populations as weapons”); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The New
Wars and the Crisis of Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict by Non-state Actors,
98 J Crim L & Crimin 711, 714–15 (2008) (explaining that nonstate actors have fewer
resources than governments, which prevents those actors from fighting with conventional methods and materials).
68 See Greg Miller, Under Obama, an Emerging Global Apparatus for Drone Killing
(Wash Post, Dec 27, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/DY5R-6MFT (noting the development of secret bases, domestic and foreign, from which drone strikes are launched and
controlled).
69 See, for example, Thom Shanker, Afghan Commandos Step Up Their Combat
Role (NY Times, May 14, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/26WP-VRKN (discussing the
significant role of US Special Operations forces in Afghanistan).
70 See Matthew Ivey, The Broken Promises of an All-Volunteer Military, 86 Temple
L Rev 525, 531 (2014) (“Prior to the Revolutionary War, each colony required all ablebodied males from sixteen to sixty to serve in the militia.”).
71 See Michael J. Malbin, Conscription, the Constitution, and the Framers: An Historical Analysis, 40 Fordham L Rev 805, 820–21 (1972).
72 See Timothy J. Perri, The Evolution of Military Conscription in the United
States, 17 Indep Rev 429, 430 (2013).
73 See Ivey, 86 Temple L Rev at 536–39 (cited in note 70).
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and driving President Lyndon B. Johnson out of the 1968 presidential race.74
In each instance, the draft raised the political stakes of war
and forced the executive to cultivate a political base and make a
political case for engaging in combat. These dynamics were independent of the formal constitutional division of authority between
the war-declaration power of Congress and the commander-inchief authority of the president. Conscription is an important element of the cost spreading of war; it ensures that broad political buy-in is required for military adventures and tempers the
willingness of democracies to engage in war. As formulated by
Immanuel Kant: “When the consent of the citizens of a state is
required in order to decide whether there shall be war or not . . .
nothing is more natural than that they will be very hesitant to
begin such a bad game.”75 In noting the disproportionate success
of democracies in warfare, Professor Dan Reiter and Dean Allan
Stam credit both the caution before entering war and the legitimacy of a democratic government’s undertaking as significant
inhibitors of ill-advised foreign ventures.76
Conscription fits poorly with a more capital-intensive military, which requires highly skilled armed forces much more than
it requires high numbers of troops. One commentator has noted
that
shifting to conscription would significantly weaken the military. New “accessions,” as the military calls them, would be
less bright, less well educated, and less positively motivated. They would be less likely to stay in uniform, resulting in
a less experienced force. The armed forces would be less effective in combat, thereby costing America more lives while
achieving fewer foreign policy objectives.77
The Department of Defense recently made a statement along
similar lines: “Trimming force structure that is excess to strategic requirements will free up funds to ensure a ready, modern-

	
  
74 See Burt Neuborne, The Role of Courts in Time of War, 29 NYU Rev L & Soc
Change 555, 570 (2005).
75 Immanuel Kant, Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project, in Mary J.
Gregor, ed and trans, Practical Philosophy 311, 323 (Cambridge 1996).
76 See Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, Democracies at War 3–4 (Princeton 2002). For
a fuller discussion of the role of democracy in war, see generally Issacharoff, 29 Oxford J
Legal Stud 189 (cited in note 46).
77 Doug Bandow, A New Military Draft Would Revive a Very Bad Old Idea (Forbes,
July 16, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/Q8UD-PJBA.
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ized, and well-equipped military. The end strength cuts . . . are
driven by the defense strategy, which deemphasizes large, protracted, and manpower-intensive stability operations.”78
The results are readily observable, even after over a decade
of war in Afghanistan and Iraq:
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Needless to say, conscription is not the only social cost when
a democracy enters into war. But it serves as a shorthand here
for the many institutional pathways by which political exchange
is required for military undertakings, quite separate from the
formal constitutional commands that Congress declare war and
that the president conduct it. Consider, for example, the ability
to bypass civilian institutions altogether through the expansive
use of military contractors to conduct the work that would for-

	
  
78 Defense Budget Priorities and Choices Fiscal Year 2014 *17 (Department of Defense, Apr 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/93L8-Q9XK.
79 See Dinah Walker, Trends in U.S. Military Spending (Council on Foreign Relations, July 15, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/BQ9D-2L9E. We thank the Council on
Foreign Relations for providing the data used to generate this figure.
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merly have been undertaken by the military itself.80 Or consider
in this light the ability of the executive to evade much congressional oversight through the use of the intelligence services,
primarily the CIA, to undertake increasingly military-style operations.81 These examples highlight how the specific institutional form of warfare is itself a response to the internal political
dynamics triggered by the social costs of military engagement.
B.

The Military-Industrial Complex

An old quip has it that the ideal military weapon is one that
has components manufactured in all 435 congressional districts.
In his farewell address in 1961, President Dwight Eisenhower,
the last president drawn from the ranks of the military, cautioned
that “we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial
complex.”82 It would be simply extraordinary if the sheer size and
formidable economic weight of the military had no influence on
the balance of constitutional authority over warfare. Yet the role
of the military in altering the constitutional balance remains underappreciated. The growth of an independent militaryindustrial complex, even larger and more entrenched than it was
fifty years ago, is an institutional development with constitutional implications, particularly on the budgetary side.
Most legal scholarship about the war powers has paid insufficient attention to the role of Article I, § 8 in imposing a twoyear limitation on the military budget cycle. Notably, little at-

	
  
80 See Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U Chi L Rev 717, 754 (2010)
(describing the high percentage of military contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan). See also
generally Jon D. Michaels, Beyond Accountability: The Constitutional, Democratic, and
Strategic Problems with Privatizing War, 82 Wash U L Q 1001 (2004) (describing the offloading of political and psychological costs by using contractors instead of servicemen
and servicewomen).
81 See Robert Chesney, Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title
10/Title 50 Debate, 5 J Natl Sec L & Pol 539, 611–13 (2012) (noting that the executive
must notify only the House Permanent and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence
about covert action, while, pursuant to the War Powers Resolution, the executive must
consult Congress as a whole when armed forces are deployed, and also suggesting that
unacknowledged military operations have fallen outside the Resolution’s scope); Andru
E. Wall, Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations,
Intelligence Activities & Covert Action, 3 Harv Natl Sec J 85, 104–08 (2011) (arguing that
Congress’s “dysfunctional” approach—both in its arrangement of oversight committees
and in its failure to enact intelligence authorization—renders congressional oversight of
intelligence activities “complex”). Our thanks to Professor Jon Michaels for this point.
82 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American
People, 1960–61 Pub Papers 1035, 1038.
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tention has been given to the role of this limitation in reinforcing
the separation of powers constraints on the ability to wage war.83
Instead, the focus of most legal scholarship has been on the congressional power to declare war84 and its seemingly quick erosion: the formal declaration of hostilities has preceded relatively
few of the military engagements in American history and none
since World War II.85 But even a brief examination of the actual
war practices of the young republic reveals that the exercise of
the allotted powers of Congress and the executive was deeply
conditioned by the overlay of the budgetary implications of military force.
Thus, although debates on the funding of the military did
not occupy a central role in the Constitutional Convention, they
were subsumed in the discussion on the question of a standing
army, which itself did not even arise until late in the Convention, on August 18, 1787.86 Nonetheless, a standing military was

	
  
83
This argument is best made in Note, Recapturing the War Power, 119 Harv L
Rev 1815, 1821–25 (2006). See also John Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs after 9/11 154–56 (Chicago 2005) (arguing that the budgetary
powers provide a significant—and perhaps sufficient—check on executive unilateralism
in making war); Philip Bobbitt, War Powers: An Essay on John Hart Ely’s War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath, 92 Mich L Rev 1364,
1390–99 (1994); Edward F. Sherman, Legal Inadequacies and Doctrinal Restraints in
Controlling the Military, 49 Ind L J 539, 555 (1974).
84 See, for example, John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons
of Vietnam and Its Aftermath 7 n 38 (Princeton 1993) (acknowledging, in a single footnote, the relatively greater importance of preauthorization in an era of standing armies);
Harold Hongju Koh, The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power after the IranContra Affair 133, 191–93 (Yale 1990) (mentioning briefly Congress’s budgetary powers
and the proposed Byrd-Nunn-Warner-Mitchell revision to the War Powers Resolution
that would have added an automatic budgetary cutoff); Henry P. Monaghan, Presidential
War-Making, 50 BU L Rev 19, 33 (1970) (mentioning only in passing the power to end
conflict through budgetary powers). See also generally, for example, Saikrishna Prakash,
Unleashing the Dogs of War: What the Constitution Means by “Declare War”, 93 Cornell L
Rev 45 (2007); Robert F. Turner, The War on Terrorism and the Modern Relevance of the
Congressional Power to “Declare War”, 25 Harv J L & Pub Pol 519 (2002).
85 Particularly in the period since the passage of the War Powers Resolution, the
combination of the constitutional power to declare war and the statutory limitation on the
executive’s unilateral authority has prompted great interest in the historic allocation of
the warmaking powers. Thus, for example, Judge David J. Barron and Professor Martin
S. Lederman’s account of the Quasi War period focuses on the rise of executive war powers
in light of the “undeclared war” status with France and its implications for the respective
allocation of authority among the branches. David J. Barron and Martin S. Lederman, The
Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—a Constitutional History, 121 Harv L Rev 941,
964–72 (2008). But their account makes no mention of anything related to the military
budget, taxation, or other fiscal questions. See id.
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understood as an integral part of limiting the reach of the federal government. Alexander Hamilton advocated the need for a
permanent military capability to address “national exigencies,”87
but opponents feared despotism.88 The Convention compromise
was that there would be “no Appropriation of Money to that Use
. . . for a longer Term than two Years.”89 Supporters like Noah
Webster argued that the budgetary limitation eliminated the
threat of a standing army: to include a provision that prohibited
standing armies would be as unnecessary “as to prohibit the establishment of the Mahometan religion.”90 Even Hamilton’s Federalist 24 conceded that the budgetary restriction was a “real security against the keeping up of troops without evident
necessity.”91
The actual two-year limitation did not engender much serious discussion, except for a commitment that the budgets should
change with each new wave of popularly elected representatives
entering office every two years.92 Some Anti-Federalists, such as
the Federal Farmer, argued presciently that new representatives would be hard-pressed to defund an already-standing army.93 But Hamilton responded in Federalist 26 that the topic of

	
  
to Raise Armies: The Constitutional and Ratifying Conventions, 1787-1788, 33 Rev Polit
202, 203 (1971).
87 Federalist 23 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 146, 147 (cited in note 38) (emphasis
omitted).
88 See Elbridge Gerry, Observations on the New Constitution, and on the Federal
and State Conventions: By a Columbian Patriot, in Paul Leicester Ford, ed, Pamphlets
on the Constitution of the United States, Published during Its Discussion by the People
1787-1788 1, 10–11 (1888) (expressing concerns that a standing army could be called out
to suppress a few dissenters and expressing hope that this country would be ruled differently than European ones).
89 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 12.
90 Noah Webster, An Examination into the Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution Proposed by the Late Convention Held at Philadelphia: With Answers to the Principal Objections That Have Been Raised against the System; By a Citizen of America, in
Ford, ed, Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States 25, 52 (cited in note 88).
91 Federalist 24 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 152, 153 (cited in note 38).
92 James Iredell, Answers to Mr. Mason’s Objections to the New Constitution, Recommended by the Late Convention: By Marcus, in Ford, ed, Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States 333, 363–66 (cited in note 88). See also Donahoe and Smelser,
33 Rev Polit at 203 (cited in note 86).
93 See Richard Henry Lee, Observation Leading to a Fair Examination of the System of Government, Proposed by the Late Convention; and to Several Essential and Necessary Alterations in It: In a Number of Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican, in Ford, ed, Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States 277, 304 (cited in
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the army would be so contentious that biennial, vigorous debate
would be inevitable.94
In contrast to a standing army, a navy poses less of a risk of
either tyranny or a coup d’état; there is no analogous temporal
limitation on naval appropriations in the Constitution. Nevertheless, an analogous debate played out at the Convention between the “navalists” and the “antinavalists.” Navalists, largely
backed by northeastern merchants defended by John Adams,
sought a blue-water navy capable of protecting merchant shipping and projecting American power.95 Antinavalists, led by
southern planters like Thomas Jefferson, favored a coast guard
made up of smaller gunboats intended for the protection of
coastal waters.96 Indeed, the arguments of the antinavalists directly tied their opposition to a naval force beyond a coast guard
to the fear that “[a] peacetime navy could serve as a vehicle for
unwanted involvement in European affairs, and its fiscal cost
was likely to exceed even the most extravagant estimates.”97
Budgetary constraints were an ever-present limitation on
the major military engagements of the early republic that were
understood not to involve any foreign power at all: the persistent
battles with Native Americans. Already in 1789, the Indian Wars
demanded appropriation of “a sum far exceeding the ability of
the United States to advance, consistently with a due regard to
other indispensable objects.”98 A year later, President George
Washington cited the possibility of war with the Creek tribe,
“necessitating a 5,000-man army costing over $1,000,000 per
annum—enough to scare any congressman.”99
An examination of Hamilton’s advocacy for a larger standing army shows how central the budgetary power was to military engagements and foreign relations, even in the Quasi War
period. Hamilton urged the creation of a national peacetime army as early as at the 1783 Continental Congress.100 This proposal was rebuffed at the Convention and then rejected in the
constitutional text, which instead reserved to the states the
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See Craig L. Symonds, Navalists and Antinavalists: The Naval Policy Debate in
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96 See id at 12–13.
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power to maintain and train the militias.101 In the specific context of tensions with France, particularly after the XYZ Affair,
the budgetary power brought Congress into direct negotiations
with the executive, even in the absence of a formal declaration of
war.102 Congress authorized the first substantial expansion of
the military in 1797, but that amounted to only $800,000 and
was funded by a stamp duty.103 This changed with the XYZ Affair, which sparked the Quasi War and proved to be a pivotal
point in authorizing and funding the army and navy. In May of
1798, Congress passed the Provisional Army Act,104 supplementing the armed forces by twelve thousand men and authorizing
the executive to call an additional ten thousand troops if war
was declared, if an actual invasion took place, or if there was
“imminent danger of such invasion.”105
In the session before the XYZ Affair, Congress allocated
$454,000 for defense; following the XYZ Affair, Congress passed
national defense legislation costing $3,887,971—“more than the
entire First Congress had appropriated for all government expenditures”—and added over $6 million in the following session.106 The naval budget for 1798—$1.4 million—exceeded the
combined naval spending from the country’s first decade.107 This
unprecedented spending was mirrored by unprecedented taxation. Congress authorized two forms of federal taxes to fund the
national defense: the Stamp Act108 (which “eerily resembled the
British Stamp Act of 1765”109) and a direct house tax.110 The latter, a graduated tax on houses, was the first federal tax levied
directly on the people.111
The significance of the appropriations extended beyond just
congressional buy-in and reached the stage of engaging a “civi-
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(2000) (discussing the interactions between Adams, Hamilton, and Congress in light of
the XYZ Affair).
103 See id at 79.
104 Act of May 28, 1798 (“Provisional Army Act”), 1 Stat 558. See also Newman, 67
Pa Hist: J Mid-Atlantic Stud at 84 (cited in note 102).
105 Provisional Army Act § 1, 1 Stat at 558. See also Richard J. Ellis, The Development of the American Presidency 204 (Routledge 2012).
106 Newman, 67 Pa Hist: J Mid-Atlantic Stud at 86–87 (cited in note 102).
107 Ellis, The Development of the American Presidency at 203 (cited in note 105).
108 Act of July 6, 1797 (“Stamp Act”), 1 Stat 527.
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cally militant electorate,” to use the terminology of two centuries
later.112 The new tax was met with stark popular opposition. In
January and February of 1799, Congress received petitions protesting the tax, the new military measures, and the contemporaneously enacted Alien and Sedition Acts113—“[v]irtually every
one of [the petitions] included the tag-word ‘standing army.’” 114
On March 2, Congress passed the Eventual Army Act,115 authorizing the president to augment the national army with
state militiamen not only in case of invasion but also to “suppress [domestic] insurrections.”116 Just five days later, John
Fries and a group of armed Pennsylvanian Germans stormed
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, to free local citizens who had been arrested for resisting the direct house tax.117 Fries’s Rebellion successfully freed the tax-resisting neighbors and spread to other
parts of Pennsylvania; the rebellion also came to be called the
“Hot Water War,” as citizens took to throwing scalding water out
of windows at tax collectors.118
In sum, even in the absence of declared war, budgetary restraints forced the president into direct engagement with Congress, which in turn was held acutely accountable to the citizenry for the tax consequences of its military expenditures.
Flash forward two centuries to another not-quite-declared
war and the contrast looms large. Whereas the funding of the
military provided the central site for interbranch discourse in
the early phases of the American Republic, the prolonged engagements of the early twenty-first century show the ability of
an institutionalized military to maintain its overseas obligations
even in the face of domestic discord over war aims and uncertainty over the extent of battlefield engagement.
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Part of the reason for the current permanent military budget is that “[n]o modern military which must depend upon ongoing weapons research and technology could function under [the]
burden” of securing new appropriations every two years.119 As
captured by one commentator: “To render the Two-Year Clause
effectual in the age of a standing army and significant investment in physical infrastructure, the President would not be allowed to use equipment and weapons (including long-term investments) funded under the Army Clause beyond the temporal
limits of congressional authorization.”120 Congress has gotten
around the Two-Year Clause121 through the use of “no-year”
funding, in which Congress will allocate a certain amount of
money to the military that will remain available until it is
spent.122
Once again, the altered budgetary reality of the military recedes in the scholarly focus on the constitutional disputes after
September 11. Instead, the crux of attention is the relation of
the Authorization for Use of Military Force123 to the constitutional power to declare war and to the statutory authorization
under the War Powers Resolution.124 But the military today looks
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123 Pub L No 107-40, 115 Stat 224 (2001).
124 Barron and Lederman, whose account of post-9/11 conflicts focuses on presidential actions contravening statutory authorization, have described scholarly debate as focused on presidential action pursuant to statutory authorization:
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Because Congress unambiguously authorized military operations against those
responsible for the September 11, 2001, attacks in the Authorization for Use of
Military Force (AUMF) signed one week after the attacks, and one year later
enacted a similar authorization for the subsequent conflict in Iraq, scholarly
debates over separation of powers in the current conflicts, including especially
the war on terrorism, . . . have centered . . . on the scope of the President’s Article II powers to determine how to prosecute military campaigns that Congress has plainly authorized.
David J. Barron and Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb––
Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 Harv L Rev 689, 700–01
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nothing like the army that could be funded (or defunded) in earlier phases of American history, in which military buildups for
war were followed by the demilitarization of government activity.125 Consider the current, relatively steady state of American
defense spending in the post–World War II period, as compared
to the more-typical mobilization and demobilization that accompanied World War I and World War II.126
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FIGURE 2. NATIONAL DEFENSE OUTLAYS, FISCAL YEARS
1910–2007127

Over time, an entire coterie has emerged of defense contractors, lobbyists, individuals who move between government service and the private sector, and local constituencies dependent
on the spillover economic benefits of military activity.128 As one
study has concluded, after the fall of the Soviet Union,
[m]ilitary bases were shuttered or left open not due to military necessity, but rather following consultation with local
economic leaders. Weapons systems were halted or sustained not because Pentagon planners desired or could do
without them, but instead because contractors had wisely
placed production facilities in the districts of influential legislators. By the 1990s, American labor finally won . . . widespread recognition of employment as a consideration in defense spending. In short, the military–industrial complex
refused to let go even at the Cold War’s end, proving itself
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an integral part of the structure of the American economy
and political process.129
Now consider how the permanent military is able to absorb
even the costly wars of the past decade. Even at the outset of
Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003, Treasury Secretary
John Snow declared: “The cost of the war will be small. . . . We
can afford the war, and we’ll put it behind us.”130 The costs
turned out to be significantly high, with an end-of-2014 estimate
of $1.6 trillion.131 Despite the rising price tag, though, military
spending accounted for only 4 percent of the 2008 economy132
(with the Iraq War a still smaller 1 percent of the economy).133
By contrast, military spending accounted for 9 percent of the national economy during the Vietnam War and 14 percent during
the Korean War.134
Unlike Vietnam, Korea, or any other American war, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have not been funded through
higher taxation.135 Two days after the beginning of Operation
Iraqi Freedom on March 19, 2003, Congress passed a budget
with tax cuts that totaled over two-thirds of a trillion dollars
over the course of eleven years.136 As many commentators have
observed, “[t]his contrast—between an active war effort on one
hand and substantial tax cuts on the other—has no precedent in
American history.”137 President George W. Bush was “bucking
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history” in that “taxes ha[d] been increased for every war the
United States has fought.”138
Despite some resistance, the bottom line is that neither the
political branches nor the public had to absorb either the costs of
war in the form of political accountability or a direct impact on
consumption in the form of higher taxes. Congress both authorized the war and cut taxes, and the American public, through
deficit spending,139 passed the full costs of war on to future generations, who are conspicuously absent from any contemporary
political debates. To the extent that the warmaking powers have
been constitutionally and politically constrained by their budgetary implications, that element of the calculus is in significant
decline.
C.

The Isolated Armed Forces

There is no escaping the fact that the casualties of war touch
fewer and fewer Americans. Only about 0.5 percent of the US
population has served in active military duty.140 In fact, as the
following figure from The Pew Research Center shows, the level
of military service by Americans in the years since September 11,
2001, approaches the historic lows that existed before the draft
for World War I and in the interwar period—despite the combat
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan that now constitute the
longest sustained military engagement in American history.141
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FIGURE 3. AMERICANS’ PARTICIPATION IN THE ARMED FORCES
DURING THE TWENTIETH CENTURY142

Increasingly, the military is almost a segregated caste in
American society. Some 60 percent of veterans under the age of
forty have an immediate family member who served in the military, while the number among the overall civilian population under the age of forty is 39 percent.143 This trend is likely to increase over time, as 77 percent of adults over the age of fifty
report having an immediate family member who served in the
military; that number drops to 57 percent of those ages thirty to
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forty-nine and then to only 33 percent for those ages eighteen to
twenty-nine.144
Modern warfare allows the broad population to have greater
psychological and economic distance from conflict. Elsewhere,
one of the authors of this Essay has addressed the strategic implications for ill-considered war efforts when a democracy resorts
to covert action and when its populace is largely free from the
burdens of war, both in terms of mandatory military service and
in terms of increased taxation.145 As Reiter and Stam concluded
in their study of democratic success in war, covert action “increases the risks of policy failure.”146 Undoubtedly, no nation can
choose all the wars that it is forced to fight. However, the focus
here is not on the strategic risk that follows but rather on the
implications for constitutional accountability of the war effort.
CONCLUSION
We began with the phenomenon of constitutional disequilibrium, the process by which technological, institutional, and societal changes destabilize a settled understanding of the allocation
of constitutional authority. Our claim is that forces external to
the constitutional text and its formal allocation of authority
have significantly undermined the efficacy of checks on the president’s ability to make war. The military has evolved from an ad
hoc agglomeration of militias or a mass draftee army, depending
on the conflict, to a professional, socially isolated institution
with tremendous political and economic sway and the ability to
conduct technologically advanced warfare at little marginal cost
in domestic human or economic terms. By and large, these shifts
would not appear to directly implicate the Declare War
Clause.147 This makes it not at all puzzling that the War Powers
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Resolution—which recognizes the desuetude of the Declare War
Clause but narrowly targets the same formal mechanisms—has
not restored the balance between the legislature and the executive.
The framework laid out here suggests an answer to the
question of why the War Powers Resolution has underperformed
in its objectives: The power to make war is not governed merely
by the Declare War and Commander-in-Chief Clauses. Rather,
an important and underappreciated part of the constitutional
equilibrium came through the two-year budgetary limitations on
the length of appropriations for the army. And while there has
been some interest in an automatic funding cutoff to revivify the
War Powers Resolution,148 even such proposals would not redress
the erosion of the implicit strictures caused by political resistance
to the social and political costs of making warfare on a significant
scale. It is these practical, real-world constraints on the power to
make war, far more than the Declare War Clause itself, that have
been thrown into disequilibrium. While a revitalized War Powers
Resolution is outside this Essay’s scope, an effective strategy for
rekindling accountability must recognize the complexity of the
original constitutional equilibrium governing war and the corresponding diversity of the sources of disequilibrium.
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